Abstract. In the present article we show that the predictions of quantum mechanics lead to violations of Bayes' rule when considering the probability of the conjunction of two events. Quite interestingly, a similar effect of conjunction fallacy is well known and experimentally tested in cognitive science as a cognitive heuristic, which occurs for intuitive judgments in situations of bounded rationality. Thus we suggest that in cognitive science the formalism of quantum mechanics can be used to describe a quantum regime, the bounded-rationality regime, where the cognitive heuristics are valid.
Introduction
This article addresses two main directions of research: the investigation of how the quantum formalism is compatible with Bayes' rule of classic probability theory, and the attempt to describe with the quantum formalism systems and situations very different from the microscopic particles. A number of attempts has been done to apply the formalism of quantum mechanics to research fields different from quantum physics, for example in the study of rational ignorance [1] and of semantical analysis [2] . Quantum mechanics, for its counterintuitive predictions, seems to provide a good formalism to describe puzzling effects of contextuality. In the present article, we will try to describe within the quantum formalism an important heuristic of cognitive science, the conjunction fallacy [3] . This heuristic is valid in regime of bounded rationality, which is characterized by cognitive limitations of both knowledge and cognitive capacity. Bounded rationality [4] is a central theme in behavioral economics and it concerns with the ways in which the actual decision-making process influences agents' decisions.
This article is organized in order to be readable both from quantum physicists and from experts of cognitive science. In section 2 we introduce the basic notation of quantum mechanics, and we show in 2.2 that the quantum formalism describing two non-commuting observables leads to violations of Bayes' rule. In section 3 we describe the answers to a question in bounded-rationality regime in terms of vector state and density matrix of the quantum formalism. Finally, in section 3.1 we show how the quantum formalism can naturally describe the conjunction fallacy.
The main results of this article are: 1) tests on non-commuting observables lead to violations of Bayes' rule; 2) the opinion-state of an agent for simple questions with only two possible answers can be represented, in bounded-rationality regime, by a qubit state; 3) the different questions in bounded-rationality regime can be formally written as operators acting on the qubit states; 4) the explicit answer of an agent to a question in regime of bounded rationality can be described as a collapse of the opinion state onto an eigenvector of the corresponding operator; 5) the probability of the conjunction of two different questions in bounded-rationality regime leads to the violation of Bayes' rule. The conjunction fallacy thus results as a consequence of this general fact.
In conclusion, we present a very general and abstract formalism which seems to describe the heuristic of conjunction fallacy. We think that a similar study can be done for other heuristics of cognitive science (this will be presented in new papers). Thus these heuristics could be simple applications of a general theory describing the bounded-rationality regime, which probably will lead to new interesting predictions. This could confirm the hypothesis that the processes of intuitive judgement could involve mechanisms at a quantum level in the brain.
Quantum basic formalism
We first introduce the standard bra-ket notation usually used in quantum mechanics, introduced by Dirac [5] , and then the density matrix formalism. In particular, we focus our attention on the concept of qubit. In the simplest situation, a quantum state is defined by a ket |s , which is a vector in a complex separable Hilbert space H. If the dimension of H is 2, the state describes a qubit, which is the unit of quantum information. Any quantum system prepared identically to |s is described by the same ket |s .
In quantum mechanics, we call a measurable quantity an observable, mathematically described by an operator, for example A, with the important requirement that it is hermitian: A = A † , where A † is the conjugate transpose. In the case of a single qubit, any observable A has two real eigenvalues a 0 and a 1 and two corresponding eigenvectors |a 0 and |a 1 . Another property of hermitian operators is that its eigenvectors, if normalized, form an orthonormal basis, that is
where i, j = 0, 1 and δ(i, j) is the Kroneker delta, equal to 1 if i = j and null otherwise. Given such a basis in the Hilbert space, we can write them in components as
representing the quantum analogue to the two possible values 0 and 1 of a classical bit. An important difference is that in the quantum case a state can be in a linear superposition of 0 and 1, that is
with s 0 and s 1 complex numbers. We also say that the state |s is a superposition of the eigenstates |a i . In the vector representation generated by formula (2), the ket |s and its dual vector, the bra s|, can be written respectively as
Another mathematical object, which is important in order to describe probabilities, is the inner product, also called braket. In general, the inner product of two kets |s and |s ′ can be written, in the basis of the obsevable A, as s|s
are the components of |s ′ in the same basis. Thus the inner product of |s and its dual vector is s|s = |s 0 | 2 + |s 1 | 2 , and it is equal to 1 if the vector is normalized. Finally, |s i | 2 = | a i |s | 2 is the probability P (a i ) that the measure on the observable A has the outcome i = 0, 1. The state |s is called a pure state, and describes a quantum state for which the preparation is complete: a preparation is complete when all the compatible observables have been defined (we will give further a precise definition of compatible observables).
In the most general case, a quantum state is described by the density matrix ρ, which is an hermitian operator acting on H. The density matrix ρ describes in general a mixed state, that is a state for which the preparation is not completely determined. For example, the state may be in the preparation |s 1 with a probability P 1 , and in the preparation |s 2 with a probability P 2 (the two vectors may be not orthogonal). We also say that the the mixed state is a (statistical) mixture of the two states (or of the two preparations):
In the particular case where there is only one P i = 1, we have ρ = |s s|, that is a pure state. The opposite situation is when the eigenvalues of the density matrix are all equal. In the single-qubit example, they are both 1/2, and the resulting operator is the identity matrix acting on the Hilbert space H:
The resulting state is called maximally mixed, and can be considered as the situation where the actual knowledge of the state is null. The elements of the single-qubit density matrix ρ can be expressed in the basis of A, with i, j = 0, 1, as
where the diagonal elements ρ i,i represent the probability P (a i ) to measure a certain value a i of the relevant observable. An equivalent expression of these probabilities can be written in terms of the trace-matrix operation:
This formula is the most general expression of the probability to measure a value a i of an observable, when operating on quantum systems identically prepared in the state ρ. The formalism of the density matrix helps us to write in the most general form the mean value of an observable A as
which becomes, by using formula (7) and the basis vectors of A, A = i a i P (a i ).
Collapse of the state vector
One of the axioms [5] of quantum mechanics states that, given an initial mixed state ρ and an observable A acting on a discrete Hilbert space, we can define from the eigenvectors {|a i } of A the projection operators {|a i a i |}, where for a single qubit i = 0, 1. Thus if the measure of the observable A is the eigenvalue a i , the state updates as
This general formula is valid for an orthonormal basis {|a i }, and defines the collapse of the initial state onto the state vector |a i . At first the collapse of the state may seem quite obvious. For example, given the initial probability distribution P (a j ) given by equation (8) corresponding to the initial state ρ, we have from simple calculations that
This means that, after measuring a certain value a i of A, the probability that the observable actually has another value a j = a i is null. This fact is valid also in classic probability theory. Nevertheless, we will show in the next subsection that the collapse leads to violation of classic laws of probability theory when considering more than one observable.
Finally we note that, in the study of rational ignorance presented in [1] , the collapse admits a very simple interpretation. Given an initial opinion state, described by ρ and a question A, after a subject has given an answer a i , the probability that the repetition of the same question A in the same conditions gives a different answer is null.
Non-commuting operators and Bayes' rule
In quantum mechanics the operators associated to the observables may not commute: for example, given two operators A and B, acting on the same Hilbert space H, the ordered product A B can be different from B A: in this case the two operators do not commute and we write [ A, B] = 0, where [ A, B] = A B − B A is the commutator of the two observables. The consequences of this fact are very important, and lead to violation of Bayes' rule. Let us consider for simplicity a single-quit system and the eigenvectors {|a i } and {|b i } of A and B respectively (with i = 0, 1). The probability of measuring the value a i or b i for the observables A or B respectively is given by equation (8), that is:
We now consider the conditional probability P (b j |a i ), defined as the probability to measure the observable B with value b j , given the occurrence of a measurement of A with value a i . In quantum mechanics, the occurrence of a measurement of A with result a i means that the actual state is |a i , independently from the initial state before the measurement. This is a consequence of the quantum collapse, and leads to many differences form the classic case. In quantum mechanics thus we have that
Let us now consider the Bayes' rule, which defines the joint probability to measure contemporarily the values a i and b j for observables A and B respectively:
This equation is very important in classical probability theory, since it links the joint probabilities relevant to A and B to the conditional probabilities. In quantum mechanics one can not measure contemporarily two commuting operators. From a formal point of view, this impossibility is evidenced from the fact that, by using the equations (12) and (13), we have in general that
This means that the joint probability P (a i , b j ) can not be univocally defined. What we can rigorously define is
where P (a i → b j ) is the probability to measure a i for the observable A and then the answer b j for the observable B . Form the previous observation, we have that
. We call P (a i → b j ) the consecutive probability to measure a i and then b j . Equation (15) evidences that in quantum mechanics the Bayes' rule is violated. Many of the paradoxical results of quantum mechanics are due to this violation. In the present article, we give three particularly important examples: 1) the repeated Stern-Gerlach experiment 2) the conjunction fallacy 3) the conditional probability fallacy.
In the repeated Stern-Gerlach experiment one measures the observable A, then the non-commuting observable B and finally again A. Equation (16) defines the probability that the result of the second measure is b j , given a i . But the third measure leads to a non-null probability P (a k → b j ) for k = i: in other words the third measure can give a result of the obsevable A different from the first measure. This is impossible from a classic point of view, since the initial joint probability is P (a i , b j ) and it changes three times (there are three measures) according the following equation:
where a i and b j are the measured values for A and B. Note that the third measure gives the same value for A of the first measure. The conjunction fallacy is a violation of quantum systems of the following inequality, which is a consequence of Bayes' rule (14)
In other words, the joint probability of two events a i and b j is always lower than the probability of one of two events. This simple fact can be violated by quantum systems, since from equation (15), if P (a i ) ≫ P (b j ), we can have that
This fact is well known in cognitive science, and in the next section we will recall the quantum formalism and equation (19) to describe it. The last effect we want describe in this article is the conditional probability fallacy, which is the assumption that P (a j |b i ) = P (b i |a j ). In classical probability theory this is not valid in general, while in quantum mechanics it is always true, as can be seen from equation (13). A question naturally arises: the conditional probability fallacy is a wrong assumption or it is the consequence of a different formalism describing the conditional probabilities, valid in particular situations? In the next section we will try to answer to this question.
Bounded rationality and Hilbert spaces
The bounded rationality [4] is a property of an agent (a person which makes decisions) that behaves in a manner that is nearly optimal with respect to its goals and resources. In general, an agent acts in bounded-rationality regime when there is a limited time in which to make decisions, or when he is also limited by schemas and other decisional limitations. As a result, the decisions are not fully thought through and they are rational only within limits such as time and cognitive capability. There are two major causes of bounded rationality, the limitations of the human mind, and the structure within which the mind operates. This impacts decision models that assume us to be fully rational: for example when calculating expected utility, it happens that people do not make the best choices. Since the effects of bounded rationality are counterintuitive and may violate the classical probability theory (and the Bayes' rule), we will often speak of bounded-rationality regime as the set of situations where the bounded rationality is an actual property.
We will show that some typical behaviors of the bounded-rationality regime can be described in a very effective way by the quantum formalism. We will study from a statistical point of view the opinion state of agents having the same initial information. In particular, we will assume that the opinion state of a agent can be represented as a qubit state, that is in terms of a density matrix ρ or, in simple cases, of a ket |s in a Hilbert space H of dimension 2. As in quantum mechanics experiments, it is important to define carefully the preparation of the opinion state. Every previous information given to an agent before performing a test can be considered as the preparation of the opinion state. When we repeat a test on more agents, it is important that their opinion state is (at least in theory) identically prepared.
The basic test in the context of bounded rationality is a question. We consider a question A for which the possible answers can only be 0 or 1 (false or true), and we associate it to an operator A acting on the Hilbert space H. Like in quantum mechanics, the question A is an observable, in the sense that we can observe an answer: thus, when speaking of questions, we will consider directly the associated operator A. The answers 0 and 1 are associated to the eigenvalues a 0 = 0 and a 1 = 1 of A, while the eigenvectors |a 0 and |a 1 correspond to the opinion states relevant to the answers 0 and 1 respectively:
The eigenvectors |a 0 and |a 1 have a very precise meaning: if the opinion state of an agent can be described for example by |a 1 , this means that the answer to the question A is 1 with certainty. If we repeat the same question to many agents in the same opinion state (thus identically prepared), each agent will give the same answer 1. If instead the opinion state about the question is definitely 0, then we have the eigenvector |a 0 . Any observable can be written in the basis of its eigenvectors as A = i a i |a i a i |.
A superposition of the opinion states |a i about question A is, like in equation (3), |s = s 0 |a 0 + s 1 |a 1 , where |s i | 2 = | a i |s | 2 is the probability P (a i ) that the agent gives an answer i = 0, 1 to the question A. In the most general case, the opinion state can be represented as a density matrix ρ. The probability that the answer to the question A is a i is given by equation (8): P (a i ) = T r(ρ|a i a i |).
We note that the formalism introduced is the same used to describe questions in regime of rational ignorance [1] , where people choose to remain uninformed about a question A. In fact, the bounded rationality can be considered as a more general than the rational ignorance, where the question is preceded by some additional information.
The conjunction fallacy
The conjunction fallacy is a well known cognitive heuristic which occurs in bounded rationality when some specific conditions are assumed to be more probable than the general ones. The most often-cited example of this fallacy originated with Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman [3] is: Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She majored in philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and social justice, and also participated in anti-nuclear demonstrations. Which is more likely? 1) Linda is a bank teller. 2) Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement. It is proved that 85% of those asked chose option 2. However, mathematically, the probability of two events occurring together (in conjunction) will always be less than or equal to the probability of either one occurring alone. In fact, the questions of the test are: A: "is Linda active in the feminist movement?" B: "is Linda a bank teller?" The 85% of those asked considered P (a 1 , b 1 ) bigger that P (b 1 ). This is in contradiction with the classic laws of probability, as evidenced by equation (18) and by
The rich mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics is able to give a simple explanation of the heuristic. Let us suppose that the two questions A and B are in bounded-rationality regime, and that the relevant operators are non-commuting. Both the eigenvectors of A and B, defined by equation (20), form two orthonormal basis of the Hilbert space H. Thus we can express the eigenvectors of A in the basis of the eigenvectors of B and vice-versa, obtaining the general equations:
We know moreover that P (a 1 ) ≫ P (b 1 ), since the probability that the answer to the first question is true is much bigger than the probability that the second answer is true (A is more representative than B). From equation (13) and from equations (22,23) we can calculate the conditional probabilities
Since the Bayes' rule is violated by the quantum formalism, we can not define univocally the joint probability to measure a 1 and b 1 , but only the consecutive probabilities P (a i → b j ) or P (b j → a i ) defined by equation (16). Since A is more representative then B, we will consider P (a 1 → b 1 ) and not P (b 1 → a 1 ), thus obtaining
For example, let us suppose that the initial state is a statistical mixture of the two answers a 0 and a 1 :
By using equations (8) and (23), we have that
. We note that a different initial state can be a pure state, that is a superposition
where s i are real parameters such that P (a i ) = |s i | 2 , reproducing the same statistical predictions for A of the previous mixed state. By using equation (23), we have P (b 1 ) = P (a 0 )cos 2 (θ) + P (a 1 )sin 2 (θ) + 2s 0 s 1 sin(θ)cos(θ). Thus inequality (25) holds for
evidencing that the positivity or negativity of s i in the superposition of the pure state can change the possible values of θ. We argue that the sign of the parameters in the linear superposition (3) may lead to interesting framing effects, which will be studied in a separate paper.
Finally, we conclude by noting that in the bounded-rationality regime we can not consider simultaneously the questions A and B: a similar result has come from the study of rational ignorance [1] . The order with which we consider the questions is also important. Since the question A is more representative of Linda, it is more likely that the first question that is considered is A, with probable answer a 1 : thus the opinion state collapses in |a 1 with probability P (a 1 ). Then, if we consider also the question B, we have to consider P (b 1 |a 1 ) = | a 1 |b 1 | 2 and to compute P (a 1 → b 1 ), which results to be bigger that P (b 1 ). It must be noted that outside the bounded rationality situation each agent follows the classic probability theory.
Repetition of questions
Let us consider in bounded-rationality regime an opinion state ρ and a question A: by using equation (10), the resulting opinion state is for example |a 0 a 0 |. Then, we ask a second question B, whose basis elements are connected with A by equation (22) . The answer will be b 0 with probability cos 2 (θ) or b 1 with probability sin 2 (θ), and the opinion state will collapse in |b 0 or |b 1 respectively. If now we ask again the question A, we expect that the opinion state about it will not change from before, as evidenced by equation (17), but this is not true in bounded-rationality regime. In fact, the probability that the answer to the repeated question A is a 1 (and thus different from before) is, by using equation (23), sin 2 (θ) or cos 2 (θ) for b 0 or b 1 respectively. In the following formula, we illustrate as an example the case a 0 → b 0 → a 1 :
The bounded rationality situation has manifested an irrational behavior of the agent. The question A has been asked two times, but what has been changed is the context. The opinion state of the agent in the test has evidenced a contextuality effect. Thus it has great importance, in bounded rationality, also the temporal order of the different questions. The paradoxical situation is due to the usual belief that we can assign pre-defined elements of reality to individual observables also in regime of bounded rationality. In a classical situation, if we ask to an agent the two questions associated to the observables A, B, we can consider simultaneously the two answers (a i , b j ), and we can study the joint probability P (a i , b j ). In a bounded rationality regime, instead, this is not possible if the related observables are non-commuting. We say that the answers to these questions can not be known contemporarily, thus giving an important limit to the complete knowledge of the opinion state of an agent in bounded-rationality regime. This effect in microscopic world is called quantum contextuality [6] , and evidences, for any measurement, the influence of other non-commuting observables previously measured. The repeated sequence of questions in regime of bounded rationality is the analogue of the repeated Stern-Gerlach experiments in quantum mechanics. Now a question naturally arises: from the point of view of an agent in boundedrationality regime, what is more real, in the situation described by equation (26): the first answer a 0 or the third a 1 (related to the same question)? In other words, how can such a contradiction be hidden to an agent? In the famous EPR article [?] is given a quite precise definition of reality, which can be useful: if we can predict the value of an observable without perturbing in any way the system, we have an element of reality. For example, if we have the probability distribution P (x) = δ(x, x) without performing any measure on the system, then the observable X is an element of reality. Thus different observables can not be simultaneous elements of reality. The same situation appears in the bounded rationality regime: the answers to two different questions associated to non-commuting operators can not be elements of reality at the same time. The limitations of the bounded rationality make real only one answer at once.
Conclusions
This article, addressed both to quantum physicists and to experts of cognitive science, presents two main results: a) we show that the quantum formalism is incompatible with Bayes' rule of classic probability theory, by writing a simple inequality (19) that is valid for quantum systems but not for probabilistic systems. b) we give a description within the quantum formalism of the possible answers to a question in bounded-rationality regime. We use mathematical objects like vector state and density matrix to describe the opinion state of agents, and hermitian operators for the questions. Finally, in section 3.1 we show how the quantum formalism can naturally describe the conjunction fallacy, which results to be represented by the same inequality (19) obtained for quantum systems. Thus we conclude that the conjunction fallacy can be considered as a natural consequence of the quantum formalism used to describe the bounded-rationality regime. We think that other cognitive heuristics can be described in terms of quantum formalism, such as the framing, the anchoring and the primacy effect. If this will be done (probably in a next paper), we could have the evidence that the judgement processes in boundedrationality regime have, at least formally, a quantum nature.
